POSSESSION AS A ROOT OF TITLE
In these days when nearly every transaction connected with
'land is committed to writing there is a tendency to overlook the
importance attached by the law to mere possession, but nevertheless possession still remains a root of title. In very early days,
no doubt, possession was practically the only title to land: he
was the owner who, with his retainers, was strong enough to take,
and then to retain, possession. And in the more civilized of ancient
communities land was transferred from one person to another by
physical possession being given in the presence of witnesses. A
record of what was done might be drawn up and signed, as in the
case of livery of seisin, but the writing did not constitute the title
to the land; it was merely evidence in support of the title.
If a person today enters upon and takes possession of a parcel
of land, without any title or even color of title thereto, but merely
.as a wrongdoer, what is his position in the eyes of the law? At first
no doubt he is a mere trespasser, and could be evicted by the true
owner, or by any person, not being the true owner, who was in
possession of the land. But this latter person may himself have
originally been a mere trespasser. This raises the question, At
what point of time does the original taking of possession by a
stranger to the title cease to be regarded as a mere trespass, and
evolve into the "possession" that is so respected by the law?
The answer appears to be, When he has remained for some time
.in peaceable possession of the land, exercising with respect to it
the ordinary rights of an occupier.
In Doe d. Hughes v. DyeballT the plaintiff in ejectment proved
.a lease to himself and a year's possession, and rested his case
there. The defendant, who had forcibly taken possession, objected that no title was proved in the demising parties to the
lease. Lord Tenterten, C. J., said, "That does not signify; there is
ample proof; the plaintiff is in possession, and you come and turn
-him out: you must show your title."
I Moody and Malkin's Reports, 346

(1829).
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The failure on the part of the plaintiff to prove that his lessors
had title obviously made the lease worthless as evidence of the
plaintiff's title, and the plaintiff succeeded on the other evidenceadduced by him, viz., that he had had a year's possession. Thus
the case shows that possession in the plaintiff and nothing more
is sufficient to enable him to maintain ejectment against a stranger.
In Asher v. Whitlock,' Cockburn, C. J., referring to the above
mentioned case, said: "In Doe v. Dyeball one year's possession by
the plaintiff was held good against a person who came and turned
him out, and there are other authorities to the same effect," thus
putting that case upon possession alone.
Perhaps the most emphatic way in which the law shows its
respect for possession is by its rule that "the fact of possession is
primafacie evidence of seisin in fee."a
"The wrongful seisin acquired by a disseissor gave him a real,
though wrongful, estate, a 'tortious fee simple' valid as against
everyone but the person truly entitled, and capable of being made
right and perfect by a release from that person to the person in
actual seisin."4 This is very instructive. The law insisted on
livery of seisin, but when once a person had been put in possession
by this means he was capable of taking a release by deed of an
estate in remainder. Here we see that the real owner could perfect
the title of a disseissor by giving him a release, no livery of seisin
being necessary.
The necessity of possession as a root of title explains the rule
of common law which prevented a person from conveying tohimself. "The ancient Common Law essayed to wield the land
itself,--' the most ponderous and immovable of all the elements.'
Hence all its rules and forms regarded real property as more or less.
identified with actual possession. The single consideration that
livery was the primitive mode of conveyance, for which other forms.
were but substitutes, and that a man could not deliver seisin to
himself, explains many otherwise inexplicable doctrines."r&
2

Law Reports, i Queen. Bench 5 (1865).
3 Per Mellor, I., in Asher v. Whitlock, 6; See also Newell on Ejectment (1892),,
433.
4 Pollock and Wright on Possession, 94, citing Co. Litt., §473.
5Hayes' Elementary View of Uses, 8o (184o).
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A person occupying land without any title has a devisable
interest therein, and if lie settles it by his will for successive estates
those estates take effect as against a person who enters upon the
land, and ejectment may be maintained accordingly.$
And the interest of a mere possessor may also be inherited or
conveyed. Moreover if the land be taken compulsorily he is entitled to compensation.,
In the last cited case, the decision in Doe d. Mary Carter
v. Barnard' was disapproved of as being inconsistent with Asher
v. Whillock, already cited, and with the views of Mr. Preston,
Mr. Joshua Williams, Professor Maitland and Mr. Justice Holmes.
The reporter adds a reference to an article by Professor J. B.
Ames in the Harvard Law Review.' In the above cited case of
Doe v. Barnard the plaintiff in ejectment, though having had
thirteen years' possession, failed in her action against a defendant
(who had turned her out), on the ground that her own case
showed possession, and therefore a presumed fee simple, in her
late husband, and showed also that her husband left an heir.
The plaintiff's possession was not connected with her husband's,
and the defendant was allowed to set up the title of the heir in
answer to the plaintiff's claim. As above shown the case has been
disapproved of.
If A, having no title, should acquire possession and ho'd it
animo dominendi for say one year and then mortgage the property
to B and remain in po.session paying the interest, and then C,
a stranger, acquired and held possession for less than 20 years,
also animo dominendi, it would appear that B, the mortgagee,
(although neither he nor the mortgagor had obtained a title under
the Statutes of Limitation) could eject C, since B would claim
under the earlier possession. A's possession would be prima facie
evidence of his seisin in fee; would be capable of conveyance to
his mortgagee, and the mortgagor's possession would be attributed
to the mortgagee1 (The mortgagee, in the case above put, would,
'Asher v. Whitlock, supra.
7 Perry v. Clissold (9o7) Law Reports, Appeal Cases 73.
3 13 Queen's Bench 945 (1849).
'Vol.
3, P. 324, n.
1

0 Cole on Ejectment 462, 479 (1857).
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of course, not be claiming adversely to the mortgagor.) A title
would therefore be set up good as against all persons except the
true owner proving right to immediate possession. Or if, in the
simpler case, without there being any mortgage, A held peaceable
possession for one year, and went out of possession, animo revertendi, and C took possession and held it for any period
less than required by the Statutes of Limitation A could in like
manner eject him in reliance on his (A's) earlier possession and
presumed fee simple.
The case first put of there being a mortgage is exemplified
by "Doe on the several demises of Smith and Payne v. Webber"."
The plaintiff Payne had been in possession for a number of years,
though no statutory title was relied on. Then he mortgaged the
property to the plaintiff Smith, but remained in possession, paying
the interest on the mortgage. After the date of the mortgage the
defendant brought ejectment under some claim of title against
the plaintiff Payne (who was still in possession) and the cause was
submitted to arbitration, which went in favor of the defendant,
who thereupon went into possession under a writ of habere facias
possessionem and remained in possession for about six years before the
the action was brought. The defendant set up the award as against
the plaintiff Smith, who was proved to have been present at the
arbitration proceedings, but not to have taken any part in them.
The evidence was ruled out as being res inter alios acla, and the
plaintiff Smith obtained the verdict. All that the case decides
is that the evidence was rightly rejected.
It would be interesting to know what direction was given by
the trial judge to the jury, but it is not reported. The verdict
seems, however, to have been right. The plaintiff Smith was
deemed to be in possession by reason of his mortgagor's continued
-possession and payment of interest, and the defendant had not
acquired a statutory title,
The effect of the case is thus given in Pollock and Wright on
Possession: "Ten years' possession has been decisive even against
several years' subsequent possession under color of title."s
u i Adolphus and Ellis 119 (1834); 3 Law Journal, King's Bench, 148;
3 Nevile and Manning 746.
12P. 96
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As exemplifying at once the risks attending nisi prius practice
and the necessity of some system of registration of title or of deeds,
it appears that the defendant went to trial in ignorance of Smith's
tit'e, and had trained the evidence concerning the award against
the plaintiff Payne. Then, discovering the mortgage, the defendant
sought to deflect this evidence against the mortgagee, which
was not allowed. The two plaintiffs appeared to have been working
together in the action, and it was complained by the defendant's
counsel that Payne was going behind the award by way of using
Smith's name as a second plaintiff.
The minor, though none the less important, question of the
costs of the evidence concerning the award was later dealt with,"s
when the defendant was allowed such costs as against Payne,
as costs of the issue found in favor of the defendant as against
Payne, who, of course, could not succeed in face of the award.
The doctrine that possession is a root of title exists independently of the Statutes of Limitation. It is true that the judges,
when speaking of a title by possession short of a statutory title,
,generally go on to say that the title is one that may ripen into an
absolute title, but it seems clear that a possessory title would be
recognized by the courts if there were no Statutes of Limitation.
It would fol'ow therefore, in a case where no Statute of Limitation
operated, that so long as a mere possessor was left in undisturbed
possession by the true owner and those rightfully claiming under
him, he, the possessor, would have a title recognized by the courts,
and one that would descend to his heirs or could become the
subject of conveyance or devise, and would be good as against
all the world except the true owner for the time being.
In conclusion it may be pointed out that wher6 there -have
been several successive possessions by strangers to the title, the
last possessor can take advantage of the prior possessions only if
all the possessions have been continuous, and are connected as
of right.
T. F. Martin.
Wellington, New Zealand, August, z1Q3.
132 Adolphus and Ellis 448.

